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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
and for your own profit and an injury results, the risk of paying for that
harm should rest upon you rather than upon the person who quite inno-
cently gets injured. 3 6
Here it is not so much a matter of respective wealth, rather it is a
matter of the company's capacity to absorb the loss. 37  In actuality all
that is being done is simply distributing the risk to the general public.
It has been demonstrated that "in the long run the burden we impose on
an enterprise for the benefit of society, will be shifted to society."38
In the situation herein considered, the company has knowingly and
voluntarily assumed the risk of litigation and, having thus assumed the
risk, should now bear the burden. Only through such an approach will
it be made certain that ". . . the insurance company no longer holds the
assured 'in the hollow of its hands.' "
CHRISTOPHER NARDI
Parental Responsibility and the Financially
Irresponsible Youthful Driver in Ohio
Motor vehicles travel an estimated thirty-six billion miles per year
on the streets and highways of Ohio.' While the social advantages, in
terms of communication and mobility, are great, the harm, in terms of
personal injury and property damage caused by automobiles, cannot be
considered less than appalling. During 1957, there were 154,544 re-
portable2 accidents in Ohio, of which 79,385 resulted in personal in-
juries and 2,044 in fatalities.3 This staggering rate of death and injury
has produced many problems, both legislative and judicial, not the least
of which has been the problem of compensation for accident victims. A
-blameworthy driver's inability to respond in damages has left many an
innocent party without any recourse. There were 39,243 drivers under
the age of twenty-one years involved in reportable accidents during 1957,
and the problems of compensation involved in this area are particularly
acute, since the youthful motorist is more likely to -be financially irre-
sponsible than is the adult driver.
"SELDREDGE, supra note 33 at 34.
1PRoSSER, TORTS § 4 (2d ed. 1955).
' Isaacs, Fault and Liability, 31 HARv. L. REV. 954 (1918).




THE PROBLEM IN THE COURTS
With the advent of the automobile, countless accident victims found
themselves in the following situation. Having been injured as a result
of the negligence of a youthful driver, a victim learns that the youth
has no assets of his own; he doesn't even own an automobile, having
been driving the family car at the time of the accident. Realizing that
a suit against the minor would be a futile effort, the victim feels he
ought to be able to look to the youth's father for compensation. He
finds this path blocked, however, -by a formidable obstacle, in the form
of the traditional rules of tort liability. The relation of parent and child
involved no fusion of legal identity, and the parent was not responsible
for the torts of the child merely because of the parental relationship.4
Thus, many an innocent victim had to remain uncompensated even though
the owner of the automobile involved may have been in a position to
pay the damages. He could only recover against the father on some
theory apart from the family relationship itself, such as ratification of
the act,5 or an actual master-servant relationship between the father and
the child.0
Faced with the obvious hardship that the traditional rules of tort lia-
biity imposed upon such victims, many courts solved the problem by
seizing upon a concept already firmly embedded in judicial precedent
and "bending" it to fit the exigencies of the times. The concept utilized
was that of agency, and the doctrine that was molded out of it was the
"family purpose" or "family car" doctrine, a species of implied agency.
The rationale was that the parent, having supplied a car for the pleasure
and general use of his family, made the pleasure to be derived from its
use his business or affair. The pleasure of each member of the family
is a part of the family pleasure, so that a member driving the car solely
for his own enjoyment can -be said to be furthering the "business" of
the parents.7 Thus, these courts found a master-servant relationship, and
11956 estimate furnished by the Ohio Department of Highway Safety, Statistical
Division.
2 OHIo REv. CODE § 4509.01 (J) defines accidents reportable under the Financial
Responsibility Law to include all motor vehicle accidents resulting in bodily injury
or death or damage to the property of any one person in excess of $100.
8 These and other statistics cited in this paragraph were obtained from the 1957 An-
nual Summary of Motor Vehicle Traffic Accidents in Ohio, compiled by the Ohio
Department of Highway Safety, Statistical Division.
'PRossmt ToRTs 680 (2d ed. 1955).
'Howell v. Norton, 134 Miss. 616, 99 So. 440 (1924).
'Broadstreet v. Hall, 168 Ind. 192, 80 N.E. 145 (1907).
72 HARPER & JAmEs, TORTs § 26.15 (1956).
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the father was held vicariously liable for the tort of his child, regardless
of the fact that the child was on a mission of his own.8 This doctrine
has been adopted in about one-half of the states
The remaining half of the jurisdictions have expressly rejected the
doctrine, however, being unwilling to disrupt the well settled principles
of tort liability.10 Ohio has cast its lot with this group of decisions.
In Elms v. Flick," the Ohio Supreme Court firmly rejected the family
car doctrine. Defendant's unemancipated son was driving the family car,
as he had general permission to do, when he negligently struck the
plaintiff. The trial court submitted the case to the jury under a charge
embodying the theory that the father would be liable if he purchased
the car for the use of his family and permitted his son to drive it. This
was held to be erroneous. The opinion reiterated the principle that a
parent is not liable for the torts of his child unless the parent in some
way participates in that tort.
The mere fact of the relationship as father and son therefore does not
give rise to liability of the former for the acts of the latter. The principle
of respondeat superior has no application where there is no relation of mas-
ter and servant or principal and agent'
In Ohio, therefore, a victim of a youth's negligent driving of his
father's car was left without recourse if the child proved financially ir-
responsible. In order to reach the pocket-book of a parent, the plaintiff
would have to qualify for relief under one of the settled principles of
tort liability, such as negligent intrustment or actual agency. Thus, when
a father intrusted his car to an inexperienced fourteen year old son for
a pleasure trip, it was held that there was a jury question presented as
to the competence of the boy; the father could thus be held liable, not
on a theory of ownership or agency, but on the combined negligence of
the owner and the driver, the negligence of the father being founded
upon intrusting the car to an incompetent driver' 83 It is important to
8 Lattin, Vicarious Liability and the Family Automobile, 26 MlcH. L REv. 846
(1928).
"Typical among the cases which announce the doctrine are the following: Watson
v. Burley, 105 W. Va. 416, 143 SE. 95 (1928); Kayser v. Van Nest, 125 Minn.
277, 146 N.W. 1091 (1914); Graham v. Page, 300 111. 40, 132 N.E. 817 (1921);
Philips v. Winchester,'100 Conn. 12, 122 Ad. 792 (1923). Cases collected in
Annot., 132 A.L.R. 981 (1941).
"Some cases which rejected the doctrine are: Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N.J.L 754,
71 Ad. 296 (1908); Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N.Y. 111, 115 N.E. 443
(1917); Spence v. Fisher, 184 Cal. 209, 193 Pac. 255 (1920); Markle v. Perot, 273
Pa. 4, 116 Ad. 542 (1922).
100 Ohio S. 186, 126 N.E. 66 (1919).
'id. at 193, 126 N.E. at 68.
'Elliot v. Harding, 107 Ohio St. 501, 140 N.E. 338 (1923).
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note that in the area of negligent intrustment the normal rule is that
intrustment of a car by the owner to a person who has no operator's
license will not in itself constitute negligence as a matter of law.' 4 It
is negligence per se, however, to intrust a motor vehicle to a minor
under the age at which he would be eligible to obtain a license, the
theory being that the prohibitory enactment 15 itself is a conclusive
declaration that a minor under the specified age is incompetent to drive
an automobile.'
In addition to these theories of negligent intrustment, the law of
agency may also provide a means of recovery against a parent. The
owner of a motor vehicle is liable for its negligent or reckless operation
by an employee or agent acting within the scope of employment,' 7 and
there is no reason why a member of one's family may not be an agent
or servant of the head of the family. Even the cases rejecting the family
purpose doctrine have expressly stated that the parent would be liable
if the child was operating the car as the agent or employee of the par-
ent.la Moreover, if the owner was present in the car, there arises a
rebuttable presumption that the driver is acting as his agent; in the
absence of rebutting evidence, the negligence of the driver is imputable
to the owner.1? The courts have, however, been steadfast in their ad-
herence to strict principles of agency; doctrinal grounds have not been
overly stretched to alleviate the situation fostered by the rejection of the
family purpose doctrine. It has, for instance, been held that the statutory
duty to send a child to school creates no agency when the son drives his
father's car to school, where there is no evidence that he had express or
implied authority to do so.
THE PROBLEM IN THE LEGISLATURE
I. OHIO Rv. CODE § 4507.07
Cognizant of the tremendous problems that existed in the area of
"' Mr. Nebo Baptist Church v. Cleveland Crafts Co., 154 Ohio St. 185, 93 N.E.2d
668 (1950).
'OHIo REV. CODE 5 4507.31 prohibits any person from permitting any minor
under eighteen years of age to drive, unless such minor first obtains an operator's
license.
"Wery v. Seff, 136 Ohio St. 307, 25 N.E.2d 692 (1940).
'
7Fowler v. Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919).
'Elms v. Flick, 100 Ohio St. 186, 126 N.E. 66 (1919); Bretzfelder v. Demaree,
102 Ohio St. 105, 130 N.E. 505 (1921).
"Riley v. Speraw, 42 Ohio App. 207, 181 N.E. 915 (1931). The rule was also
applied to a situation in which a wife was driving in the presence of her husband,
who owned the car. The contributory negligence of the wife was imputable to the
husband, barring him from recovery for damage to his car. Rcss v. Burgan, 163
Ohio St. 211, 126 N.E.2d 592 (1955).
'Littler v. Voigt, 21 Ohio App. 285, 153 N.E. 311 (1925).
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compensation of accident victims, and of the lack of remedial action
forthcoming from the courts, the Ohio General Assembly has enacted a
statute which forbids the granting of driving license to any person under
eighteen years of age, unless the application is signed by a parent, guar-
dian, or some other responsible person.
Any negligence or wilful misconduct of a minor under eighteen when
driving a motor vehicle upon a highway shall be imputed to the person
who has signed the application, which person shall be jointly and severally
liable with such minor for any damage caused by such negligence or wilful
misconduct.'
This statute and its counterpart in other states have been construed
fairly literally. The negligence imputable comprehends all negligence,
including contributory negligence.22  Furthermore, this section does not
relieve a guest from meeting the requirements of the guest statute;23
wanton misconduct on the part of the son must be found in order to
create liability against the father who has signed the application. 24 Simi-
lar laws have been elsewhere held to impose liability on the signing par-
ent even after the subsequent marriage of a minor daughter; 25 but pa-
rental liability will cease upon expiration of the license, notwithstanding
the fact that the child has not yet reached his eighteenth birthday.26
Similarly, the liability of the parent extends only to the time when the
minor reaches his eighteenth birthday, even though the original license,
the application for which was signed by the parent, is still in effect.27
This statute, insofar as it goes, solves many of the problems dealt with
by this note. Its weaknesses and shortcomings are, however, only too
apparent. As noted, its operation ceases when the minor reaches eighteen;
thus, the situation remains unchanged in regard to unemancipated youths
over eighteen. It also fails to alter the situation respecting an unlicensed
driver who has attained driving age, and it must be borne in mind that
the theory of negligent intrustment cannot here be absolutely relied upon
as a means of recovery against the parent, since the intrustment of an
automobile to an unlicensed driver who is of age to drive will not be
negligence as a matter of law.28  Thus, this statute alone cannot be con-
sidered a panacea to the ills dealt with in this note.
2 OHIO REV. CODE 5 4507.07.
nHartough v. Brint, 101 Ohio App. 350, 140 N.E.2d 34 (1955).
13OHIo REv. CODE § 4515.02.
'Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520, 80 N.E.2d 122 (1948).
'Easterly v. Cook, 140 Cal. App. 115, 35 P.2d 164 (1934).
'Houston v. Holmes, 202 Miss. 300, 32 So.2d 138 (1947); Sommers v. Van Der
Linden, 24 Cal. App.2d 375, 75 P.2d 83 (1938).
'Garrett v. Lyden, 161 Ohio St. 385, 119 N.E.2d 289 (1954).




II. The Financial Responsiblity Law
The other major piece of legislation having to do with this problem
of parental responsibility is the Financial Responsibility Law. It was
first enacted in 1935, amended in 1943, and its present form codified by
the ninety-ninth General Assembly in 1953.29 The avowed purpose of
the act was to "eliminate the reckless and irresponsible driver from the
highways, and to provide for the giving of security and proof of financial
responsibility by persons driving or owning motor vehicles."30
There are three principal facets to the law designed to achieve these
goals. The first involves accident reporting; the driver or owner must
file a report with the Registrar of Motor Vehicles of any accident in-
volving death or personal injury or property damage of $100 to the
property of any one person. If the report shows that no insurance was
in effect then the amount of damages for which each person could be
held liable will be determined. The person will be notified, and must
then deposit security in that amount.31 In no case will the required
amount exceed $5,000 for death or injury to one person, $10,000 for
two or more persons, or $5,000 for property damage.32 Failure to de-
posit security will result in suspension of driving and registration privi-
leges for one year. The security will be returned after one year if no
suit is pending, but all judgments before that time will be paid out of
the deposited security. The second phase of the law requires the suspen-
sion of the registration and driving privileges of any person convicted
of one of five major traffic offenses3 3 unless the motorist gives, and
thereafter maintains, evidence of financial responsibility.3 4 The third
major provision requires the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend driv-
ing and registration privileges of a person who has not satisfied a judg-
ment within thirty days after it has become final. The privileges cannot
be restored until the judgment is satisfied or an agreement is made for
its payment in installments, and the individual will also have to give and
OHio REv. CODE c. 4509.
8'124 OHIO LAWs 563 (1951).
OHIo Rnv. CODE § 4509.12.
2OHIo REV. CODE §5 4509.15 and 4509.20.
'The offenses are: 1) automobile manslaughter, 2) perjury in making out a false
affidavit under the driver's license laws, 3) use of a car in commission of a felony,
4) driving while intoxicated, 5) failure to stop after an accident. OHIO REv. CODE
§ 4507.16.
Proof of financial responsibility is defined as proof of the ability to respond in
damages in the amount of $5,000 because of bodily injury or death of one person,
$10,000 for two or more persons, and $5,000 for the property damage. OHIO REv.
CODE § 4509.01 (K).
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maintain proof of financial responsibility. The judgment is deemed sat-
isfied for the purpose of reinstatement of privileges, however, if pay-
ment is made to the extent of the standard $5,000-410,000-$5,000
limits.8 5
Even a cursory examination of the provisions of this law reveals that
it goes a long way toward effectuating its ostensible purpose. It is
manifest that insurance coverage has been greatly increased, a fact which
obviates a large portion of the problem herein contemplated. Specifically,
our problem is greatly relieved by this act due to the fact that both the
driver and the owner will be subject to the sanctions made available by
the act.36 In other words, if the accident report does not show financial
responsibility on the part of the driver, the security and suspension re-
quirements will operate against him; if he doesn't comply, the owner is
required to comply; if he fails to do so, then he, too, can suffer loss of
driving and registration privileges.
The shortcomings of this act as a solution to the problem are obvious.
It must be borne in mind that no tort liability is created or extended
by the act. All it does is to apply the sanction of loss of privilege as an
inducement to procuring insurance and satisfying judgments. Liability
of the head of the family is not created, rather, it still rests with the
son; but if the father doesn't see to it that the judgment is paid he may
have to suffer the consequences. Thus, the consequences become all im-
portant as an evaluating factor, and it is to be noted that the sanctions
themselves are fairly weak. Some might prefer to suffer loss of privi-
leges rather than pay a judgment. Furthermore, a situation in which the
father does not himself have a driver's license and does not care about
owning a car for his family is conceivable, and the sanctions would be
no inducement whatsoever to such a person. The $5,000-$10,000-$5,000
limits also point up a weakness, since no sanctions at all will be applied
to induce satisfaction beyond that limit.
Pragmatically, the effectiveness of any sanctions can best be measured
in terms of the number of times that they need be invoked - a threat
is only as strong as the unwillingness of those to whom it is directed
to succumb to the consequences of non-compliance. The following
figures represent the total numbers of revocations of privileges for 1957,
including all cases processed through December:3 7
OHIO REV. CODE § 4509.41.
T OHIo REV. CODE S 4509.11.
= Figures obtained from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Safety Responsibility Divi-
sion, Columbus 16, Ohio.
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Revoked for failure to report 1,323
Revoked for failure to deposit ---------------------- 12,069
Revoked for conviction of certain offenses --------------- 14,057
Revoked for unsatisfied judgments --------------------- 1,593
TOTAL ------------------------ 29,042
Since the suspension provisions are invoked to such an extent, it be-
comes apparent that the reckless and financially irresponsible driver has
not been completely excluded from the highways of Ohio. While the
possibility of compensation has admittedly been greatly improved by this
legislation, the problem must still remain for a substantial number of
victims.
CONCLUSION
The advent of the automobile presented a difficult problem to the
nation's courts, viz., the uncompensated accident victim. To alleviate
the problem in one area, the family purpose doctrine was adopted by
many courts. These courts recognized that the exigencies of the times
required a drastic step, and were not hesitant in taking that step, realiz-
ing that some of the traditional precepts of tort liability would have to
give way in the process. As Justice Cardozo said: "When the social
needs demand one settlement rather than another, there are times when
we must bend symmetry, ignore history and sacrifice custom in pursuit of
other and larger ends."38
Notable among the states rejecting this doctrine was Ohio. s9 Our
courts found themselves unwilling to indulge in such a fiction. There
can be no question of the fictitious reasoning of the family purpose doc-
trine, ". . .yet the same kinds of considerations put forward to justify
the new doctrine are essentially those which justify the whole fabric of
vicarious liability."40  Vicarious liability was created by the courts, and
there seems to be no reason why social considerations of such magnitude
as were presented by the automobile should not warrant a judicial ex-
tension of its limits.
This was not the position of our courts, however. In the leading case
on the subject, the Ohio court intimated that the problem was one for
the legislature.
If contrary to the ordinary rule, the owner of a car ought to be respon-
sible for the carelessness of everyone whom he permits to use it, that
liability ought to be sought by legislation as a condition of issuing a license
rather than by some new and anomalous slant applied by the courts to the
principles of agency.'
SCARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDIcIAL PRocEss 65 (1921).
'Elms v. Flick, 100 Ohio St. 186, 126 N.E. 66 (1919).
402 HARPER & JAMEs, TORTs § 26.15 (1956).
'Elms v. Flick, 100 Ohio St 186, 197, 126 N.E. 66, 69 (1919), quoting Van
Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N.Y. 111, 117, 115 N.E. 443, 445 (1917).
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This call for legislation has not been answered to the fullest extent
possible. Neither the licensing of minors section42 nor the Financial
Responsibility Law,43 both of which are discussed above, fully solve the
problem. The former is desirable in that it actually extends liability to
the parent, but its scope limits its protection to the person injured by
a youth who is under eighteen and has a driving license. The latter type
of legislation has not actually increased any liability, but does apply cer-
tain inducements to make it more likely that victims will be compen-
sated; the inducements are, however, limited in application and inherently
weaker than might be desirable.
The courts have refused to depart from settled principles, and the
legislative action has been only partially successful. There are many
situations in which the victim of the negligence of a youthful driver
will still remain uncompensated, due to the financial irresponsibility of
the tortfeasor. What Ohio needs, then, is an extension of legislative
action in this area. Several possible solutions are found in the plans that
have been promulgated in other jurisdictions. Massachusetts has compul-
sory insurance.44 Unsatisfied judgment funds are found in New Jer-
sey4 5 and North Dakota.46  These statutory developments would help
our problem immeasurably, but they are designed to cope with a wider
range of problems and are beyond the scope of this note.47
Narrowed down to our specific problem, the simplest solution would
seem to be a statute, such as may be found in several other jurisdictions,
which provides that the owner of an automobile is liable for the negli-
gence of any person using it with his express or implied consent.48 This
statute would completely abrogate the necessity of the family purpose
doctrine. It also would fill the void left by the shortcoming of our
licensing statute,49 in that it would extend liability to all drivers, regard-
less of age or the possession of a driving license. It would accomplish
more than the Financial Responsibility Law,30 in that it would extend
actual liability to the parent, and not just the sanctions of possible loss
'OHIo REv. CODE § 4507.07.
'OHIO REv. CODE c. 4509.
"MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 90 § 34A et seq. (1954).
'N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6-62 et seq. (Supp. 1957).
"N.D. REv. CODE c. 39-17 (Supp. 1953).
'
TThe various plans are treated in Note, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1300 (1953). See also
a symposium on the subject of motorist responsibility, 15 OHIo ST. L. J. 101
(1954).
'Statutes of this sort have been enacted in at least twelve jurisdictions. PROSSER,
TORTS 371 (2d ed. 1955). See, for example, N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAw § 59.
" OHIO REv. CODE § 4507.07.
SOHIo RETV. CODE c. 4509.
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